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Force, Dwelling, and the Personhood of Things in Urban Malaysia 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this article I interrogate how dwellings constitute a force in ordinary urban 
environments in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. I argue that such forces are activated 
relationally via the demand for interpretation that structures elicit from the human 
beings who build, inhabit, and circulate within and between them. Following Miguel 
Tamen, I regard the act of interpretation as a process of person-making. This claim 
resembles Ingold’s revised concept of animism, although this article ultimately resists 
the use of this concept, as it appears to confuse personhood with life. Rather, the force 
that dwellings possess in urban environments such as Kuala Lumpur is located in the 
fact that they are often perceived as non-human, non-living persons capable of 
exerting certain forms of force proper to them within these environments. Thus, I 
argue that a critical element of how KL residents forge an emplacement within, and 
belief in, their ordinary life worlds was the necessity to interpret the character of their 
dwellings which were, in turn, acts that attributed to the built environment certain 
elements we would typically associate with persons. In sum, this article is a reflection 
on the personhood of things, the various intensities of force that such thing-persons 
exert on human forms of living, and the outcomes that result when this ability to act 
disrupts or contradicts the interpretative frameworks that made them agents-of-sorts 
in the first place.  
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ARTICLE 
Vertigo 
Nothing ever holds still in Kuala Lumpur. The effect of this fact is that one 
gets the sense that everything in the city, including the built environment itself, can 
potentially act as an agent. This is not particularly distinct from the accounts any 
urban dweller in Southeast Asia will give when asked to describe their form of living. 
What is remarkable about Kuala Lumpur is the sheer unexpectedness, the seemingly 
malevolent and intentional arrhythmia, of ordinary urban life and the fact that that the 
problem is not simply an inability to move but the anxiety that everything can move 
and is moving.  
Any researcher willing to sink into an ordinary life marked in this way will not 
be immune to the deranging effects of this vertigo. This admission should not be read 
as a confession; it is rather an empirical finding. The focus of my long-term research 
in the city has been on the reverberating effects of aggressive, unanticipated changes 
in urban space on ordinary life. Taking seriously claims that the very buildings of the 
city often feel like they are literally moving, I have suggested previously that what is 
at stake is the ability to form some belief in the world that would allow for the 
navigation of what Deleuze has termed “the immanent plane of existence.” Belief in 
this formulation pertains less to religiosity or intentionality prior to action than to the 
relations between sense, evidence, and ethical action in ordinary life. Lacking the 
ability to reliably assimilate what one senses in the world with what one knows about 
the world severely risks the coherence of the subject; it is my contention that the 
material character of everyday urban life in KL often threatens to rupture this very 
coherence and the forms of life that necessarily emerge out of a subject’s relations to 
other subjects and to the world.1 
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This framework of understanding does not answer every question the evidence 
raises. Specifically, what about the buildings themselves? What is it about the 
character, or even behaviour, of physical structures such as houses, blocks of flats, 
and office buildings that would prove to be unexpected, disorienting, and disturbing 
to city residents? Related to this, how can actual dwellings provide an avenue of 
expressing one’s anxieties, frustrations, and even pain in a manner that the human 
beings who inhabit such buildings struggle to find when speaking of themselves or 
other human persons around them?  
To make the question more precise, I ask here how dwellings themselves 
constitute a force in ordinary urban environments. This force is activated relationally 
via the demand for interpretation that structures elicit from the human beings who 
build, inhabit, and circulate within and between them. Following Miguel Tamen, I 
regard the act of interpretation in a very special way in that interpretation stands as a 
process of person-making. In short, the force that dwellings possess in urban 
environments such as Kuala Lumpur is located in the fact that they are often 
perceived as non-human persons capable of exerting certain forms of force proper to 
them within these environments. This claim should in no way be taken as a finding 
that my interlocutors “fetishized” buildings or were confused about the ontological 
status of their dwellings; they knew perfectly well that structures were neither humans 
nor animals. Rather, I am saying that a critical element of their own emplacement 
within, and belief in, their ordinary life worlds was the necessity to interpret the 
character of their dwellings which were, in turn, acts that attributed certain elements 
we would typically associate with persons. Thus, this article is a reflection on the 
personhood of things, the various intensities of force that such thing-persons exert on 
human forms of living, and the outcomes that result when this ability to act disrupts or 
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contradicts the interpretative frameworks that made them agents-of-sorts in the first 
place.  
Perhaps counter-intuitively, my claim that dwellings in Brickfields are 
endowed with forms of personhood proper to their status as non-human, non-living 
entities by those who live and work within them is not one rooted in classic 
anthropological traditions of animism. Rather, it possible in Brickfields for things to 
act like persons without the ascribed presence of something “human-like” such as a 
spirit “within” things such as buildings (although hauntings and possessions are also 
common). My argument here does broadly resemble Tim Ingold’s understanding of 
personhood as constituted in and through relations, but ultimately seeks to move away 
from a naturalized, “souled” concept of being as the operative force in forming 
“persons.”2 As Rane Willerslev has pointed out, Ingold’s reliance on Heidegger’s 
notion of “being-in-the-world” (Dasein) as a way to revise “animism” tends to figure 
our world of relations and persons as something experienced in an undivided fashion, 
a “total bodily immersion” able to absorb difference and blur self and world.3 This 
allows Ingold to provocatively revise anthropological understandings of non-human 
personhood, but his retention of the notion of animism comes with the price of 
continuing to confuse personhood with life. This seems at best a simple reversal of 
Heidegger’s own unequivocal claim that Dasein is essentially not a living being but 
rather constitutes a “being-toward-death”, and any emergent specificity that one may 
associate with personhood derives not from life in all its fullness, but rather from 
death.4  
Attempting to follow Heidegger reveals just how ambiguous the demand to 
apprehend the death of a being that is, in fact, not a living being at all really is when 
attempted in ethnographic contexts. Understandably, Ingold, reverses the polarity of 
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Heidegger’s line of argument back towards life, attempting to outline how one 
apprehends the world via the perception of embodied (“living”) persons (human and 
non-human) within this field of being. In contrast, while agreeing with Ingold’s claim 
that personhood is realized through relations, I will briefly suggest here that nothing 
takes place in zones of pure life or pure death and that our attempt to understand of 
the personhood of things requires neither life nor death proper. 
 
Mourning Those Who Pass Away Without Dying 
Revisiting ethnographic evidence I gained between 2000 and 2002 in the 
Brickfields area of Kuala Lumpur, I find numerous instances of residents regarding 
the dwellings in the neighbourhood as non-human persons. This period was a time of 
particularly aggressive change to the physical environment in Brickfields as the initial 
stages of the construction of the KL Sentral train station were nearing completion and 
construction of the KL Monorail transportation network commenced. One particular 
incident among many, an instance of mourning explicitly non-living beings, serves to 
concretely illustrate what I mean. 
On a hazy Sunday evening in October 2001, I stood at the edge of what 
remained of Kampung Khatijah, one of the longest standing “kampung” settlements 
in Brickfields.5 Being in formal terms an illegal settlement, no official archive of the 
settlement’s history exists, although my own archival research confirmed that 
Kampung Khatijah was in existence as early as 1955. When I had passed through the 
kampung on the previous Friday it looked more or less as it had looked for quite some 
time. Two days later, it was gone. 
I should be more precise and say that Kampung Khatijah was in the process of 
disappearing on that Sunday evening. A clean swipe cut right through the maze of 
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houses that extended back roughly half a mile to the Klang river. Turning around, I 
faced the source of the destruction—jammed into what was a little unnamed alley 
cutting between the main road (Jalan Tun Sambanthan) and Jalan Thambipillay sat a 
small battalion of heavy equipment, all neatly stencilled “KL Monorail.” Walking 
through what remained of Kampung Khatijah, I found that the residents were 
methodically working. A few walls somehow remained standing here and there, and 
the personal possessions of those who yesterday lived in these houses remained 
scattered among the rubble. Strikingly, they were methodically breaking down the 
kampung themselves. 
I asked what had happened. I find I am talking to Siva and Abdul, who were 
until earlier that day next-door neighbours in the kampung. They were willing to talk, 
although Abdul drifted away after a while. My conversation with Siva was clipped, 
fast – he worked on dismantling his house as we talked and he clearly did not have a 
lot of time. Properly recording what I was seeing and hearing was hardly my primary 
concern in the midst of this stunned, painful confusion, but I did hastily note some of 
the specific terms Siva used in trying to give some coherence to what had happened 
and what he was doing at that moment. His voicing of words like “touch” and “kill” 
were significant, as in Kampung Khatijah residents wanted to prevent the KL 
Monorail workers from “touching” their homes, from adding insult to injury after 
having already “cut” through the settlement. Faced with no other choice, the displaced 
residents elected to dismantle what remained themselves. Siva would not allow them 
to “kill” his home; he would do it himself, just as Abdul was and other neighbours 
were also doing to their own little dwellings. The care residents took in separating 
boards, bringing down walls, and levelling out brick foundations resembled how one 
would touch an injured or dying person. Having no warning and no response at the 
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level of law, politics, or justice to offer, Kampung Khatijah’s displaced residents 
could only demand that the KL Monorail workers and the police simply stop touching 
their dwellings. Like witnesses to an execution, these agents of the state stood aside 
and allowed this last request.6 
Taken in isolation, these actions and statements could easily be categorised as 
improvised reactions borne out of shock and confusion in the face of the stunning 
liquidation of the kampung – hardly the basis for any wider claim. And yet, this event 
continued to elicit similar reactions from Brickfields residents in the months and even 
years following the event. In effect, an open expression of mourning the violence 
inflicted on the kampung brought into relief a series of other possible interpretive acts 
rendering the built environment as an ensemble of persons. It was not uncommon for 
some recollection of Kampung Khatijah to emerge intermingled with a person’s own 
fears of disappearance, anger over the violation of the neighbourhood, and an 
articulated sense that proper care of the neighbourhood included the proper treatment 
of the dwellings that constituted its physical form. Very often, these articulated 
sentiments were extended to the sympathetic reference to one’s own body, 
particularly in reference to one’s own pain. Over time, it became clear that even the 
buildings themselves often did not “behave” in anticipated ways – this was 
particularly true of the rather large numbers of blind and partially-sighted people in 
the neighbourhood, whose very mobility and emplacement in the space required 
predictability from the built environment. As one partially-sighted Brickfields 
resident exclaimed, “the buildings are moving!” He caught himself, sensing that what 
he had just said might be taken as absurd, and amended his statement by adding, “The 
buildings seem to be moving.” Even noting the qualification, the interpretive frame of 
the judgement remained the same.7 
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 Can a building “misbehave” and unexpectedly move around? Can a dwelling 
be “killed”? Can the sight of a demolished building elicit something akin to 
sympathetic pain from human witnesses? I am arguing that, for my interlocutors in 
Brickfields, the answers to all of these questions was “yes”, although this answer 
seems to call for the very notion of animism that I previously marked out for 
criticism. How can one “kill” or “mourn” a non-living thing without regarding it as 
something alive? Clearly, Brickfields residents deployed such terms to give 
expression to a relationship, yet at no time were “actually” seeking to convince me or 
anyone else that they were referring to living things. Like Ingold and others, I resist 
the simple solution of bracketing this form of expression as metaphor, a joke, or some 
sort of false consciousness. And yet, if they are not talking about “life”, what are they 
talking about? To attempt an answer, I will briefly illuminate how concepts of force, 
interpretation, and personhood come together within the urban context I am 
describing here. 
 
Force, Power, and the Personhood of Things 
 Nearly all recently published works in the social sciences devoted to 
understanding the character of ordinary life make some reference to force. The sheer 
ubiquity of this idea often leads to some opacity as to what it precisely refers to. 
Given this ubiquity, however, it is worthwhile to occasionally return to a seemingly 
obvious question: what do we mean by “force” when referring to the city and its 
forms of living? 
 It is very common to conflate force with power. Michel Foucault’s 
understanding of power seems to invite this conflation, as Foucault clearly associates 
“force relations” with power: 
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It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and 
which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the 
support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or 
a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate 
them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, 
whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state 
apparatus, in the formation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.8 
 
Foucault further claims, “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, 
but because it comes from everywhere.”9  In light of such a definition, one can hardly 
be faulted too harshly for slipping into the habit of using “power” and “force” as 
synonyms. 
 A careful reading of Foucault’s definition of power, however, reveals a clear 
distinction between this concept and force. In writing that power is “the multiplicity of 
force relations immanent in their sphere” (my emphasis this time), Foucault clearly 
marks a difference between force and power that is important to note. Following 
Nietzsche, Foucault characterizes force as foundational to power, but not synonymous 
with it; this difference is crucial to bear in mind as we come to consider who or what 
constitutes a person within such spheres. 
Linking the concept of “person” to force and, by extension, to dwelling, leads 
us to the aporia between “life” and “non-life.” – this is consistent with recent 
ethnographic characterizations of everyday life in the city.10 Taking up the aporia of 
non-human persons thus expresses a particular understanding of the concept of person 
that resonates with theorists such as Bruno Latour and Miguel Tamen. 
Tamen suggests that any concept of “the person” must be understood in 
relation to acts of interpretation. He writes, “’interpretation,’ minimally defined as the 
attribution of language and intentions, is simply shorthand for the process of person-
making.”11 Tamen agrees that such acts of person-making are inextricably social, 
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noting that “something becomes interpretable, and describable in an intentional way, 
only in the context of what I have been calling a society of friends.”12 By “friends” 
Tamen means that a “community of agreement” that allows for understanding (or 
misunderstanding) must exist in order for any interpretative act to take place and, in 
turn, for persons of any sort to exist at all.13 Understood in this way, there are no a 
priori “persons” out there in the world and humans do not by definition automatically 
qualify as persons or monopolize the category by virtue of their “nature.” Tamen 
elaborates this claim when he writes that “there are no interpretable objects, only what 
counts as an interpretable object or, better, groups of people for whom certain objects 
count as interpretable and who, accordingly, deal with certain objects in recognizable 
ways.”14 Even the notion that something is “natural” or exists “beyond interpretation” 
indicates that ultimately a person is both “made and not made” through acts of 
attribution, description, and interpretation. On this score, Tamen is broadly consistent 
with Nietzsche in that the will to power interprets for the reason that “[m]ere 
variations of power could not feel themselves to be such: there must be present 
something that wants to grow and interprets the value of whatever else wants to 
grow.”15  
Tamen’s concept of person-making allows us to understand better how non-
human “actors” concretely have the kind of agency that is a central element in 
Latour’s thought.16 The argument is compelling, as Tamen eludes the comforting trap 
of placing such interpretive acts on the register of false consciousness or error. 
Indeed, we are just as able to grasp our own mode of interpreting things as persons 
(the status of corporations as juridical persons in many industrialized Western 
countries comes to mind here) as those interpretive acts by others that animate or 
bestow some form of “rights” upon things or creatures we take for granted as lacking 
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any standing as subjects. Indeed, the entire anthropological notion of animism is 
turned inside out in a productively critical manner.17  
Yet there are still complexities that remain, particularly given that “life” and 
“consciousness” are not, strictly speaking, the natural partners of the active force that 
characterizes interpretation for Tamen or the will to power for Nietzsche.18 We puzzle 
over the notion that mere things seem to possess an impossible life, not stopping to 
ask if our firm belief that we are “alive” or that we are “conscious” makes us any 
more or less a person in any taken-for-granted sense. This is clear in the way that 
Brickfields residents expressed who (or what) seemed to count as a person. Their 
expressions play with our own misrecognition of life in personhood, confronting us 
with actors that could not possibly be “alive” in the human sense and yet are regarded 
in ways that, at times, seems to indicate precisely that. In times of crisis such as the 
one in Kampung Khatijah described earlier, the words within these expressions 
simply seem to fail, pushed (as death will) beyond their capacity for trustworthy 
signification. A word like “kill” would seem to assign a life to the person being 
referred to – in Brickfields there is clearly no life assigned to such persons, yet they 
are killed all the same. 
It is thus clear that the personhood of things is not, strictly speaking for my 
interlocutors in Brickfields, about life; rather, it regards how seemingly neutral things 
can take the form of a person and, as a result, possess force within its milieu that 
cannot be understood or explained with recourse to analogy or metaphor. Force here 
is here shifted from being understood as a causal factor to a quality or intensity.19 Or, 
more directly, the very interpretive act of attributing personhood to objects accounts 
for the force that they possess and the necessity of a belief in the world that makes 
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relationally emplacing oneself in relation to others (human and non-human) within 
this world possible. 
 “All reality is already quantity of force.” Deleuze made this statement in 
reference to Nietzsche’s understanding of force, which will also help us here.20 
Nietzsche understood the body as the quintessential outcome of the multiple, plastic 
forces at play in the constitution of this reality.21 Deleuze thus summarizes 
Nietzsche’s position as follows: 
Every force is related to others and it either obeys or commands. What defines a 
body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every 
relationship of forces constitutes a body – whether it is chemical, biological, 
social or political. Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as 
they enter into a relationship. This is why the body is always the fruit of chance, 
in the Nietzschean sense, and appears as the most ‘astonishing’ thing, much 
more astonishing, in fact, than consciousness and spirit.22 
 
Thus there is no a priori privilege granted to any particular kind of body over another; 
this would include the privilege of being a living body. Rather, the body, any body, is 
constituted through the hierarchy of forces that emerge through the relations of force 
with force, emergent via the particular relation between active (dominant) and 
reactive (subordinate) forces.23 It is therefore not at all unusual that Brickfields 
residents would primarily experience the disorder generated out of the constant 
transformation of the physical environment in a somatic fashion, as their own bodies 
are constituted and felt through relations of force with other bodies. Interpreting the 
structures around them as persons, an unusual form of sympathy comes to exist for 
the dwellings themselves, as the interpretive act that made them persons comes with a 
body of sorts that, in turn, allows residents to situate themselves within the world. 
This in no way presumes a unity of self and world that “absorbs” the subject and 
eradicates difference. Rather, when the bodies around them are attacked, disappear, or 
are replaced by unpredictable strangers, the effects of these actions are felt by 
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Brickfields residents as forces that challenge or reorder their sympathetic, hierarchical 
reality. In other words, they truly do experience vertigo. 
 
Conclusion: The world(s) within Kuala Lumpur 
 Numerous recent ethnographic studies of Kuala Lumpur bear out the social 
consequences of living in a state of vertigo.24 These studies consistently describe 
Kuala Lumpur as “fragmentary,” “dystopic,” “out of sync” and shot through with 
“invisible” social forces that serve to both destabilize established forms of living and 
pave the way for new ones to emerge.25 The speed and intensity of urban life that such 
adjectives imply are quite real for ordinary residents of the city and the emergence of 
a milieu marked, as Ross King notes, by “contradictions, inconsistencies, and 
resentments,” is hardly accidental.26 What is striking about King’s description is the 
implication that there is a multiplicity of “worlds,” often associated with dissidents 
and minorities, which emerge within the obsessively singular social vision of the late-
Mahathir era in Malaysia.27 These worlds continue to be generated out of the very 
dogmatism that characterizes the Malaysian government’s approach to urban 
development.28 Strikingly, it is very often the case that one can simultaneously sense 
the existence and movement of these worlds without being able to see, describe, or 
anticipate them in any concrete or consistent way. In other words, they are sensible 
but invisible. Filip de Boeck and Marie-Françoise Plissart’s description of “the 
invisible city” within Kinshasa could just as easily apply to Kuala Lumpur: 
 
The invisible was in the invisible, and vice versa, not as a matter of artifice, but 
as one and the same and as external reality simultaneously – as the image of the 
thing and the imagined thing, at the same time.29  
 
 14 
In other words, we have a picture of what the world consists of prior to our sensory or 
conscious apprehension of it. This picture is often glossed as “the supernatural” and 
de Boeck and Plissart are concerned in this passage with the phenomenon of child 
witchcraft that was pervasive at the time of their fieldwork in Kinshasa. While the 
supernatural worlds that would give rise to such figures are central to any 
understanding of Kuala Lumpur as well, this is however not the invisible world that I 
am describing here. Rather, our situation is both much more mundane and, in its own 
way, as difficult to precisely apprehend or believe as witchcraft is. 
 Descriptions of life in Kuala Lumpur as “hypermodern” and “surreal” often 
imply that the aggressive form of development pursued in Malaysia in the early years 
of the twenty-first century produced a narrative of “social fragmentation” in local 
media representations of Malaysian urban space.30 Such popular narratives often turn 
on the ascription of “agency” or even “life” to the forms of technology that make such 
development possible.31 This agency of things has not gone unnoticed by scholars of 
the region, particularly those focused on neighboring Indonesia, and is typically 
described as a kind of “technological sublime,” with modern technology acting as an 
active mediator between an archaic or undeveloped past and an imagined “better life” 
in the future.32 As Nils Bubandt and James Siegel have both noted, in such a situation 
it is not difficult to make the leap from technology as such as an engine of progress to 
specific technologies operating within an older, occult matrix of action.33 
 While this line of argument is valid in giving some sense of the relations 
between technologies and supernatural, invisible worlds, I have argued something 
quite different here when I claim that dwellings are endowed with forms of 
personhood by those who live and work within them. The need to bestow some form 
of personhood on dwellings serves to, at least in part, explain the vertigo and distress 
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of my interlocutors in Kuala Lumpur. Attributing this distress to “animism” or 
“anthropomorphism” in the service of explaining why urban dwellers in Kuala 
Lumpur protect their dwellings from unwarranted touches, grieve for them when they 
are eradicated, miss them when they are gone, and fervently wish that they would stop 
moving around, only serves to distance their interpretations from our own acts of 
person (and, by extension, world) making. Yet under certain conditions, all of us not 
only attribute personhood to things, and we must do so in order to simply dwell in the 
world. Brickfields presents its own specificity that should not be carelessly 
generalized; but even in taking this caution, we should be able to sympathetically see 
our own predicaments as bearing a close kinship to theirs. To gain an understanding 
of dwelling as a condition or intensity, and dwellings generally, we must grasp the 
complex interplay between acts of interpretation that bestow elements of a (non-
living) personhood on things and the force enabling, and enabled by, such acts in 
urban contexts. If we can accept that non-living dwellings can also be persons, then 
we must be prepared to accept what they express, joining our friends and interlocutors 
in acts of engagement that already characterize an important part of what it means to 
dwell in contemporary cities the world over. 
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